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The perpetual inventory method used for the construction of education data per country leads 
to systematic measurement error. This paper analyses the effect of this measurement error on 
GDP regressions. There is a systematic difference in the education level between census data 
and observations constructed from enrolment data. We discuss a methodology for correcting 
the measurement error. The standard attenuation bias suggests that using these corrected data 
would lead to a higher coefficient. Our regressions reveal the opposite. We discuss why the 
measurement error yields an overestimation. Our analysis contributes to an explanation of the 
difference between regressions based on 5 and on 10 year first-differences. 
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Measurement error in education is widely recognized has an important source of bias in
growth regressions; see for example Krueger and Lindahl (2001). This paper shows that
the way Barro and Lee (2001) constructed the education data yields a systematic error.
Some data points are directly derived from census observations, other are derived from this
previous census information, using enrolment data and the perpetual inventory method for
updating. We show that this updating yields a systematic measurement error, as it yields
an underestimation of the growth of education during the period. Previous attempts to
correct for this error have either only been successful for a limited number of countries
or were based on arbitrary corrections made by the researcher (see de la Fuente and
DomØnech, 2002, and Cohen and Soto, 2001). Our analysis leads to a simple correction
procedure for data points based on the perpetual inventory method that does not require
any ad hoc decisions.
The issue of the measurement error in education data is of great practical relevance
for the interpretation of the relation between education and GDP. There are two main
approaches: (i) Nelson and Phelps (1966), and (ii) Lucas (1988). In the former, human
capital is crucial to innovate and adopt new technologies. Hence, the growth rate of output
is determined by the level of human capital. In the latter, human capital is interpreted
as a normal input in the production process. Hence, changes in output are determined
by changes in the human capital stock. The estimated e⁄ect of education on economic
growth depends on the reliability of education data. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999) conclude that it is the level of education, not its change,
that has an impact on economic growth, which is evidence in favour of Nelson and Phelps￿
argument that growth is driven by the stock of human capital catch up. Krueger and
Lindahl (2001) argue that these conclusions are highly a⁄ected by measurement error in
the average education of countries. The problems of measurement error are exacerbated
when taking ￿rst di⁄erences. First di⁄erences reduce the signal and increase the noise.
2Hence, the signal - noise ratio falls dramatically by ￿rst di⁄erencing. Krueger and Lindahl￿ s
solution to this problem is to increase the di⁄erencing period from 5 to 10, or 20, years,
thereby increasing the signal. They show that indeed the coe¢ cient on the change in
education increases by taking a longer di⁄erencing period. The authors conclude that ￿the
change in education is positively associated with economic growth once measurement error
in education is accounted for,￿￿nding empirical evidence in favour of Lucas￿argument.
However, the problem with this conclusion is that Nelson and Phelps (1966) model would
lead to exactly the same conclusion. When the level of education a⁄ects output growth,
then the e⁄ect of the level of education on output increases linearly with the di⁄erencing
period, and hence, so does the e⁄ect of the change in education.
From our analysis, ￿rst we conclude that measurement error in education data is
important. We ￿nd large and highly signi￿cant di⁄erences between data points based dir-
ectly on census information and data updated with the perpetual inventory method. One
would expect that these di⁄erences have large e⁄ect on growth regressions, in particular
where di⁄erencing exacerbates the problem, in particular when using 5 year di⁄erences.
Many countries hold a census every ten years, so that 5 year di⁄erences switch back and
forth between direct census information and updating by the perpetual inventory method.
This turns out not to be the case. Using our corrected measure of education reduces the
coe¢ cient on changes in education. This runs counter to the standard argument of con-
tamination bias, which is supposed to lead to lower coe¢ cients when using data spoiled by
measurement error. The reason for this paradox is that, in the standard model, measure-
ment error increases the variance of the explanatory variable, since the measurement error
is supposed to be orthogonal to the signal. In this case, the measurement error decreases
the variance, since the perpetual inventory method smoothes observations at the begin-
ning and the end of the observation period, thereby compressing the data. However, our
exercise contributes to the explanation of the di⁄erences in the coe¢ cient of the change
in education based on a 5 and a 10 year di⁄erencing period, and compares to Krueger
3and Lindahl (2001). All this leads to the inevitable conclusion, previously obtained by
Teulings and van Rens (2003), that education has a moderate immediate e⁄ect on GDP
of about 4:2 ￿ 6:5%, but a huge long run e⁄ect of about 54 ￿ 59%, which however takes
ages to materialize, the half value time being 75 ￿ 99 years. This conclusion is obviously
conditional on the identifying assumption that is used in whole this literature till so far,
that current innovations in GDP have no e⁄ect on current innovations in education.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe di⁄erent sources
of data on education. Then we will analyse how systematic is the di⁄erence between
census and non-census data. In Section 4 we will concentrate on the interaction between
education and growth using the new knowledge on education, comparing the results with
known ￿gures. Finally we conclude.
2 Sources of data on education
The most used data set on international education attainment is the one released by Barro
and Lee (2001).1 They build their data on educational attainment from census or survey
data. When this information is not available, the authors use a perpetual inventory method
based on enrolment data in order to generate either a forward-￿ ow, or a backward-￿ ow.
The ￿ ows are constructed from the benchmark stocks de￿ned by the census or survey
data. For intermediate observations, the constructed data point is a weighted average
of the forward-￿ ow and the interpolation between two benchmarks. For the observations
before the ￿rst and after the last census or survey, interpolation is infeasible. Then, the
constructed data apply by either the forward- or the backward-￿ ow to the closest available
census or survey data point. The enrolment data are adjusted for repeaters and changes
in the duration of years of schooling.
1Alternative sources are Kyriacou (1991) and Nehru et al. (1995). The latter ignores census data. De
la Fuente and DomØnech (2002) criticise this choice, and argue that it is di¢ cult to justify ￿discarding
the only direct information available on the variables of interest.￿
4Barro and Lee￿ s data received criticism. de la Fuente and DomØnech (2002) construct
a revised version of the Barro and Lee (1996) data set for a sample of 21 OECD countries
￿using previously unexplored sources and following a heuristic approach to obtain plaus-
ible time pro￿les by removing sharp breaks in the data that seem to re￿ ect changes in
classi￿cation criteria￿ (de la Fuente and DomØnech, 2002) to ￿avoid unreasonable jumps
in the series by choosing the most plausible ￿gure when several are available for the same
year, and by reinterpreting some of the data￿ (de la Fuente and DomØnech, 2002).2 Missing
observations are ￿lled in, if possible by interpolation, or otherwise by back- and forward
projections. The authors ￿avoided the use of ￿ ow estimates based on enrolment data be-
cause they seem to produce implausible time pro￿les￿ (de la Fuente and DomØnech, 2002).
The authors state that ￿the construction of our series involves a fair amount of guesswork,￿
and that their data ￿look more plausible than most existing series, at least in terms of
their time pro￿le.￿
Cohen and Soto (2001) extend the work of de la Fuente and DomØnech (2002) to
several other countries. An important di⁄erence to de la Fuente and DomØnech is that
Cohen and Soto allow for the use of enrolment data when needed. The authors have
constructed a data set for 95 countries with information on education achievement from
1960 to 2000, for ten year interval, plus a projection for 2010. Their methodology is
to ￿minimize the extrapolations and keep the data as close as possible to those directly
available from national censuses￿ (Cohen and Soto, 2001). They argue that some of the
di⁄erences between their data and the one provided by Barro and Lee (2001) can be
explained by: (i) divergences in classi￿cation; (ii) the use of more census information than
Barro and Lee; (iii) the use of a di⁄erent methodology for extrapolating the missing data;
(iv) errors in Barro and Lee data.
The conclusion is that, in spite of the improvements in data, so far measurement error
2These two data sets are not directly comparable since Barro and Lee￿ s data is based on people having
completed some educational level, while de la Fuente and DomØnech￿ s data applies to people who have
attended some educational level.
5in education data remains a problem. The Barro and Lee data are highly erratic. For
example, in many cases, the average education level decreases over time within countries,
which does not ￿t casual observation. de la Fuente and DomØnech￿ s data is a valuable
e⁄ort, but requires a large amount of ad hoc decisions and is only available for a sample
of 21 countries. Cohen and Soto￿ s data increases the countries sample size, but is only
available on 10-year intervals. Also, both these data sets face the criticism that measure-
ment error problems were not entirely solved. Finally, Kyriacou data is very problematic
given the estimation procedure used,3 and the fact that it is only available for the period
1965￿ 1985.
3 How systematic is the di⁄erence between census
and non-census data?
3.1 Origins and identi￿cation of the systematic di⁄erence
The hypothesis we will test is that the methodology used to impute missing values in the
Barro and Lee data underestimates the true values of education. This underestimation
results from the assumption that the survival rate is independent of the educational level.
In their own words, Barro and Lee (1993, p.374) state that ￿some error is introduced
(...) if educational attainment is growing rapidly, because the older people then have
less human capital and a greater probability of dying.￿ If average education within a
country is rising, as it seems to be the case for an important portion of the countries,
the implication would be an underestimation of the educational attainment. The increase
in the schooling level of a population occurs mainly because the younger generations are
more educated. In this case, the estimation procedure underestimates the survival of more
3Kyriacou assumes that the relationship between average years of schooling in the labour force and the
enrolment ratios in primary, secondary and higher education is relatively constant over time and across
countries.





Figure 1: Plot of education with census and non-census data
educated individuals, resulting in a lower attainment for the country as a whole. The same
idea is identi￿ed in Barro and Lee (2001, p.545), when they say that ￿in a typical country
in which educational attainment is growing, mortality would be higher for the older people
who are less educated. Then the assumption of uniform mortality can cause a downward
bias in the estimation of the total educational stock.￿
If this is true, we should observe in the data that: (i) the increase in education between
two consecutive census observations should be higher than the increase between non-census
observations, and (ii) the education level jumps upward between a non-census to a census
observation, and that this jump is larger, the larger the period since the previous census.
Figure 1 shows the argument for a hypothetical country with 9 observations. At the
horizontal axis we have the time dimension, while the vertical axis plots the average
education level in each period. The steeper and darker line represents the evolution of
true education. For simplicity, we assume that true education follows a constant trend.
The observations represented by an empty square, located in this line, represent the census
information available. The circle dots represent the estimated points using the enrolment
data and the benchmark census information. We also assume that the estimation process
leads to a constant trend, which underestimates the true value. The lighter line represents
7this. The ￿lled square dots represent the values of education that would be estimated for
periods in which we have census data.
The change in education from period 4 (the empty circle in period 4) to period 5
(the empty square in period 5) can be decomposed as the variation predicted by the
perpetual inventory method (the ￿lled square dot over the lighter line in period 5), plus
the accumulated errors since period 2, originated by the underestimation. The jump
between the non-census (hypothetical) and census data points in period 5 (the di⁄erence
between the ￿lled square dot and the empty square dot) is proportional to the time elapsed
since the previous census. In period 3 the error is given by the distance between the empty
circle and the steeper line. In period 4 the di⁄erence between the empty circle and the
steeper line gives the accumulated error in period 3 and 4. The error speci￿c to period 4
can be retrieved if we imagine a non-census trend line departing from the true education
value in period 3.
Barro and Lee￿ s procedure implies that missing values are constructed di⁄erently ac-
cording to the type of observation: (i) observations before the ￿rst census; (ii) observations
between two census observations; (iii) observations after the last census. Our empirical
strategy tests for systematic di⁄erences between census and non-census observations, where
we take into account for the di⁄erences between these three types. We constructed four
variables. Before applies to type (i) observations; it measures the lag till the ￿rst census.
Last and LastC apply to type (ii) observations; the ￿rst records the number of periods
since the previous census, while the second also records the lag till the previous census,
but just for census data points, being zero otherwise. After applies to type (iii) and meas-
ures the lag till the last census.4 These variables adequately cover the hypothesised bias
introduced by Barro and Lee￿ s procedure as depicted in Figure 1. If we used just a dummy
for non-census observation instead, then its coe¢ cient would be a weighted average of the
changes associated with di⁄erent lags till the previous census. Moreover, it would not have
4See Table 9 for an example of these variables corresponding to Figure 1.
8di⁄erentiated between the positive bias for type (i) observations and the negative bias for
type (ii) and (iii) observations.
3.2 Data description
Table 1 provides a description of the data. We will focus our attention on population aged
15 and over. The dummy variable Census assumes the value 1 for observations based on
a census or survey, and 0 otherwise. The variables Before, Last, LastC, and After are
constructed from Census variable as described above. The income variable is Real GDP
per worker, and is obtained from the Penn World Table 6.1. All variables are available
on ￿ve year intervals, between 1960 and 2000. Average income increased by 18% per
decade, while average education increased by 0:70 years, achieving 6:33 years in 2000. Its
dispersion has been relatively stable over time, with a slight increase in the beginning of
the sample period. With the exception of 1985, income dispersion has steadily increased.
Only 32% of the information on education is based on census/survey data. There is a
concentration of census information at the start of each decade, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
This is a particularly relevant feature when ￿rst di⁄erencing the data using a 5 year time
frame. 46% of the countries have 2 or less census observations, and only 26% have 4 or
more. Finally, the distribution of countries per period is relatively balanced.
3.3 Empirical evidence
Consider the following model:
Eduit = ￿t + ￿1Beforeit + ￿2Lastit + ￿3LastCit + ￿4Afterit + ￿i + "it (1)
where Eduit is the education level of country i, in period t, ￿t is the speci￿c e⁄ect for period
t, ￿i is country i￿ s speci￿c e⁄ect, and "it is a white noise error term. Taking ￿rst-di⁄erences
9Table 1: Summary Statistics ￿5 year data
Variable Statistic 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Total
Observations 104 106 110 111 112 116 111 111 985
Census Mean 0.20 0.54 0.35 0.60 0.20 0.39 0.10 0.00 0.32
Before Mean 0.61 0.30 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23
% zeros 66 81 90 98 100 100 100 100 88
Last Mean 0.46 1.04 1.03 1.29 0.85 0.91 0.17 0.00 0.64
% zeros 54 39 32 32 49 61 90 100 62
LastC Mean 0.03 0.68 0.42 0.95 0.30 0.84 0.17 0.00 0.38
% zeros 97 62 76 49 83 65 90 100 80
After Mean 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.37 0.83 1.38 2.27 3.27 0.95
% zeros 97 96 90 79 54 42 10 0 62
Education Mean 3.90 4.28 4.52 4.99 5.31 5.84 6.07 6.33 5.03
Std.Dev. 2.56 2.70 2.75 2.86 2.80 2.84 2.80 2.82 2.88
￿Edu Mean 0.13 0.44 0.35 0.52 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.26 0.35
Std.Dev. 0.29 0.57 0.40 0.60 0.35 0.53 0.32 0.14 0.44
Observations 104 104 106 110 111 112 111 111 869
LGDP Mean 8.98 9.09 9.16 9.24 9.27 9.33 9.39 9.50 9.20
Std.Dev. 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.04 1.02 1.07 1.11 1.13 1.04
Observations 85 89 92 94 95 97 97 89 821
￿LGDP Mean 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09
Std.Dev. 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.16
Observations 83 85 89 92 94 95 97 87 722
Distribution of Census per Country
Census 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Countries 25 28 33 22 6 0 1 1 116
Note: the summary statistics for ￿Edu and ￿LGDP are for changes over ￿ve year periods.
eliminates the ￿xed country e⁄ect:
￿Eduit = ￿t + ￿1￿Beforeit + ￿2￿Lastit + ￿3￿LastCit + ￿4￿Afterit + ￿"it (2)
where ￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator, and ￿t are period speci￿c e⁄ects. Estimation
results are presented in Table 2.5 In column 1 we report the estimation of equation (1),
using the ￿xed-e⁄ects estimator. Columns 2 and 3 report the results for equation (2),
where we use OLS in column 2 and ￿xed e⁄ects in column 3. For the model in levels in
column 1 the hypothesis of the absence of country speci￿c e⁄ects is rejected. We also reject
5The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and error correlation within countries.
10Table 2: Education Regressions
Levels First-di⁄erences
Variable Fixed E⁄ects OLS Fixed E⁄ects
Before 0.391￿￿ 0.250￿￿ 0.140￿
( 0.073) ( 0.055) ( 0.066)
Last -0.200￿￿ -0.198￿￿ -0.186￿￿
( 0.032) ( 0.028) ( 0.031)
LastC 0.199￿￿ 0.202￿￿ 0.193￿￿
( 0.033) ( 0.029) ( 0.029)
After -0.214￿￿ -0.272￿￿ -0.316￿￿
( 0.057) ( 0.057) ( 0.086)
Wald census variables 20.322￿￿ 17.176￿￿ 14.076￿￿
Wald time dummies 74.741￿￿ 3.353￿￿ 5.558￿￿
F-Test; H0: all ￿i = 0 251.61￿￿ 1.09
AR(1) test 159.194￿￿ -1.070 0.000
Observations 985 869 869
Countries 116 116 116
Signi￿cance levels: y : 10% ￿ : 5% ￿￿ : 1%. (Robust standard errors
in parentheses). All regressions include time e⁄ects.
the hypothesis that the level error terms are not serially correlated. When we apply the
￿xed-e⁄ects estimator to the ￿rst-di⁄erences speci￿cation (column 3) we do not reject the
hypothesis that all the country speci￿c e⁄ects are equal to zero. Hence, the ￿rst di⁄erences
without ￿xed e⁄ects (column 2) is the preferred estimation. The subsequent discussion is
restricted to this model.
The estimation results strongly con￿rm our hypothesis regarding the biases in non-
census observations. All four variables have the expected sign and are highly signi￿cant.
The coe¢ cients on Last and LastC are identical in absolute value, as predicted. Further-
more, the coe¢ cient on After and Before are larger in absolute value than the coe¢ cient
on Last. This too ￿ts our hypothesis. Since the type (ii) observations are a weighted av-
erage of interpolation between neighbouring census observations and a forward perpetual
inventory method, while type (i) and (iii) are fully based on the perpetual inventory
method, the bias is larger for the latter group of observations. The magnitude of the bias
is huge, some 0:20 year per 5 year period, or about 60% of the total average increase of
11education per 5 year period. The ￿ll in procedure of the observations for which no census
information is available introduces therefore a large and systematic bias in the data. Given
the fact that many countries hold a census every 10 years (usually at the beginning of a
decade), the systematic bias in the non-census observations yields a particular erratic time
series of ￿rst di⁄erences when using a 5 year period.
3.4 How to correct for the systematic di⁄erence?
How can we use this information to improve the quality of the data? Our idea is to use
the regression results to correct the original data by the subsequent expression
PEduit = Eduit ￿ ^ ￿1Beforeit ￿ ^ ￿2Lastit ￿ ^ ￿3LastCit ￿ ^ ￿4Afterit (3)
where PEduit is the corrected education variable.6 The estimated coe¢ cients are the ones
reported in column 2 of Table 2.7
Table 3: Correlations among Education Measures in Levels
Edu PEdu EduCS EduDD Mean Variance
Edu 1 5.028 8.299
(985) (985) (985)
PEdu 0.987 1 5.281 8.883
(985) (985) (985) (985)
EduCS 0.956 0.956 1 5.683 9.957
(420) (420) (420) (420) (420)
EduDD 0.892 0.888 0.933 1 9.567 4.464
(155) (155) (80) (155) (155) (155)
Number of observations in parentheses.
Tables 3 and 4 give the correlations between the various education variables, Table 3
in levels and Table 4 in ￿rst-di⁄erences. The correlation between Barro and Lee education
level and the corrected education variable is high, 0:99. The correlation between these two
6With this formulation we impose the same bias correction across countries. Although we acknowledge
that this is not the most realistic assumption, sample size limitations restrict the available alternatives to
implement corrections speci￿c to countries.
7The data used in this analysis is available at http://www.tinbergen.nl/~portela/education.
12Table 4: Correlations among Education Measures in First-Di⁄erences
DEdu DPEdu DEduCS DEduDD Mean Variance
DEdu 1 0.350 0.192
(869) (869) (869)
DPEdu 0.888 1 0.501 0.147
(869) (869) (869) (869)
DEduCS 0.369 0.348 1 0.843 0.187
(335) (335) (335) (335) (335)
DEduDD 0.068 0.019 0.391 1 0.376 0.020
(135) (135) (60) (135) (135) (135)
Number of observations in parentheses. For DEduCS ￿rst-
di⁄erences are computed over a 10 year interval. Correlations
with the other variables take into account for this adjustment.
variables and the series constructed by Cohen and Soto (2001) (EduCS) and de la Fuente
and DomØnech (2002) (EduDD) is only slightly lower. The mean and the variance of
Barro and Lee data are the lowest of all four. For the data by de la Fuente and DomØnech,
this comparison does not make much sense, since they consider only the very selective
sample of 21 OECD countries. To a less extent, a similar objection can be raised against a
comparison to the Cohen and Soto data, where di⁄erence in the number of observations is
mainly due to the fact that they have data once every 10 years. However, the comparison
with our corrected data is highly informative. The bias in the ￿ll in procedure in the
Barro and Lee data leads to an underestimation of the average education level by 0:25
year. Even more importantly, it leads to an underestimation. An eye on Figure 1 reveals
why this is the case. The bias understates the ￿nal observations, but overstates the initial
observations, leading to a compression of the ￿true￿variance. So contrary to the classical
model, where measurement error is orthogonal to the signal and therefore increases the
variance of the observed data, here the measurement error compresses the variance.
In ￿rst di⁄erences, the correlations between education variable are much lower. The
correlation between Barro and Lee and our corrected variable is still high, 0:89. For
alternative sources of information, the correlations drop signi￿cantly. Once more, the cor-
relations are higher with Cohen and Soto￿ s data. Again a comparison of the mean and
13variance of the changes between Barro and Lee and our corrected variable is revealing. The
bias in Barro and Lee compresses the measured average growth of education substantially,
from 1:00 year per decade to 0:70 year. The variance of the changes is however overestim-
ated in the Barro and Lee data, as one would expect with all the erroneous changes back
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Figure 2: Education information for Argentina
These ideas are well documented by the data on Argentina, as shown in Figure 2.
We observe spikes at each census observation for the data estimated by Barro and Lee.
Between census (1960￿ 1990), our procedure (Predicted Education) smoothes the data.
However, for observations after the last census available (1990), the constant correction
induces a higher variance. When the variables are analysed in changes, PEdu has a higher
mean, but a smaller variance than Edu. The data also documents the dramatic di⁄erence
between the measured changes in education when using 5 or 10 year time period. The 5
year di⁄erentials are entirely dominated by the di⁄erence between census and non-census
observations.
144 Growth regressions: what changes?
4.1 OLS estimations
Having analysed the di⁄erence in education data according to its source, we will now re-
evaluate the GDP regressions. First, we estimate the macro-Mincerian growth equation
as de￿ned by
￿LGDPit = ￿t + ￿LGDPi;t￿￿ + ￿1￿Eduit + ￿2Edui;t￿￿ + "it (4)
where ￿t are time speci￿c e⁄ects, LGDPit stands for real log income per worker in country
i in period t, Eduit is the average education level, ￿ is the time span of the data, and "it
is an i.i.d. error term. All variables in changes are annualised.
The ￿rst two columns of Table 5 reproduce estimations from Topel (1999, Table 4),
and Krueger and Lindahl (2001, Table 3) [K&L(2001)]. The remaining results are our
estimations of equation (4) using the two measures of education, Edu and PEdu, at
di⁄erent time spans of the data, 5 and 10 years, respectively. The last column of Table
5 reproduces the estimations using Barro and Lee￿ s data, and including as regressors
the census variables described above. The estimation procedure is OLS, and we report
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and error correlation within countries.
Similarly to Topel (1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001), we also conclude that
contemporaneous changes in education have a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect
on economic growth, which contradicts the ￿ndings of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999). For the ￿ve year data, our results indicate that the short
run return do changes in education is around 5%, while Topel (1999) and Krueger and
Lindahl (2001) results points approximately to 4%. We also conclude that the returns
to changes in schooling increases with the time span of the data. Krueger and Lindahl
suggest that ￿the ￿nding that the time span matters so much for the change in education
15Table 5: The E⁄ect of Education on Growth - annualised OLS estimations
5 year data
Variable Topel(1999) K&L(2001) Edu PEdu Edu
￿Edu 0.041￿￿ 0.039￿￿ 0.0517￿￿ 0.0488￿￿ 0.0462￿￿
(0.014) (0.014) (0.0137) (0.0146) (0.0150)
LagEdu 0.004￿￿ 0.004￿￿ 0.0035￿￿ 0.0037￿￿ 0.0036￿￿
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
LagGDP -0.007￿￿ -0.006￿ -0.0060￿￿ -0.0063￿￿ -0.0062￿￿
(0.002) (0.003) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Census variables - - - - Yes
R2 0.218 0.197 0.1315 0.1296 0.1414
Observations 608 607 722 722 722
Countries 111 110 97 97 97
10 year data
￿Edu 0.085￿￿ 0.086￿￿ 0.0882￿￿ 0.0789￿￿ 0.0758￿￿
(0.020) (0.024) (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0215)
LagEdu 0.004￿￿ 0.004￿￿ 0.0039￿￿ 0.0041￿￿ 0.0040￿￿
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
LagGDP -0.007￿￿ -0.005y -0.0073￿￿ -0.0076￿￿ -0.0075￿￿
(0.002) (0.003) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Census variables - - - - Yes
R2 0.315 0.284 0.2336 0.2240 0.2472
Observations 290 292 353 353 353
Countries 111 110 97 97 97
Signi￿cance levels: y : 10% ￿ : 5% ￿￿ : 1%. (Robust standard errors in parentheses).
The results under Topel(1999) reproduce part of Table 4 in Topel (1999). The results under
K&L(2001) reproduce part of Table 3 in Krueger and Lindahl (2001). In this case the number
of countries is the maximum number of countries reported by the authors. All variables in
changes were divided by the time span in each data. The dependent variable is annualised ￿rst-
di⁄erence Log Real GDP per worker. All regressions include time e⁄ects. In the last column
we re-estimate the model using Edu and include the census variables as regressors.
suggests that measurement error in schooling in￿ uence these estimates￿ (p:1119). Our
interpretation is that it is the measurement error introduced by the estimation procedure
implemented by Barro and Lee that leads to this variation, not the measurement error
inherent to the census observations. Approximately 42% of the observations on education
in the 10 year data are obtained from census or surveys, while in the 5 year data this ￿gure
is only 32%. This di⁄erence in data quality is associated with a smaller spurious variation
in education in the 10 year data, which may explain way the coe¢ cient on ￿Edu increases
16with the time span.
The most remarkable feature is that the return to education is lower for our corrected
data than for the original data, which is shown to be systematically biased. The standard
attenuation bias argument tells that measurement error in an explanatory variable reduces
its coe¢ cient, quod non in this case. The coe¢ cients for our corrected variable are lower
instead of higher, for the 5 year estimation, but in particular for the 10 year estimation. A
second thought reveals the reason for this phenomenon. The measurement error reduces
the mean of the change in education by some 0:15 year every 5 year period (see Table
4). Although the estimated coe¢ cient for the corrected variable is some 6% lower8, the
estimated e⁄ect of education on GDP is 0:6 percentage points larger.9 So, the e⁄ect of the
bias on the coe¢ cient is a balance between two forces: introducing the spurious component
in ￿Edu reduces the coe¢ cient, while understatement of the average level of ￿Edu pushes
up the coe¢ cient. For the 5 year time frame, both forces almost cancel. For the 10 year
time frame, the ￿rst component is less important (since many census observations are
located at the beginning of a decade), so the latter force clearly dominates. When we use
Barro and Lee￿ s 10 year original data, returns to changes in education are 8:8%, and very
similar to the two comparison studies. However, using our corrected value for education the
estimated return is only 7:9%. The systematic measurement error on education identi￿ed
in the previous section could lead to the overestimation of its coe¢ cient in a growth
regression, which is clearly corroborated by the 10 year results. While for Topel, and
Krueger and Lindahl, the coe¢ cient more than doubles with the doubling of the time
span, the change in our coe¢ cient is smaller, which facilitates the reconciliation between
the results for di⁄erent time spans.
The bias introduced by the perpetual inventory method has a speci￿c structure as
described by equation (1). This provides an alternative way to take into account for it
8For the 5 year interval, we have (0:0488 ￿ 0:0517)=0:0517 ’ ￿6%.
9Using PEdu and Table 4 one can infer that the return to the average change in education on a 5 year
interval is 2:4%(’ 0:0488 ￿ 0:501), while from Edu we get 1:8%(’ 0:0517 ￿ 0:35).
17in growth regressions. Just for the sake of simplicity, suppose our model is de￿ned as
yt = ￿1+￿2x￿
t +￿t. Assume also that the observed value of x￿
t is xt = x￿
t +￿!t, where !t is
observed and represents the lag since last census, and ￿ is a negative coe¢ cient underlying
the computation of xt. The estimated model is yt = ￿1+￿2xt+￿t￿￿2￿!t. By regressing yt
on xt the error term is de￿ned as ￿t￿￿2￿!t, leading to an omitted variable bias. A simple
solution for this bias is to introduce the census information in our income regression. The
last column of Table 5 reports the results. The growth regression is estimated using Barro
and Lee data jointly with the census variables Before, Last, LastC, and After. The
coe¢ cients on ￿Edu and LagEdu are now slightly smaller than the ones we obtained
with PEdu. For the 5 year interval data the joint signi￿cance test on the census variables
yields an F ￿ statistic of 2:81, with a p ￿ value of 0:03, while for the 10 year data the
F ￿ statistic is 1:88, with a p ￿ value of 0:12.10
A second result, which is identical among the di⁄erent studies and time spans, indicates
that the initial level of education is relevant for economic performance. While the result
on ￿Edu supports the human capital interpretation of the role of education in economic
growth, this empirical evidence gives also support to the externalities interpretation of the
returns to education. Based on our corrected data, PEdu, the long run return to education
is 54 ￿ 59%.11 Although this return seems (too) large, we should keep in mind that the
e⁄ect takes a long time to materialize. The return is at 50% of its long-run value after
75￿99 years. The immediate return is 4:2% for the 5 year time period and 6:5% for the 10
year period.12 The numbers for the 5 and 10 year time interval are very similar. This puts
10A further factor that yields overestimation of the e⁄ect of education based on the Barro and Lee data
is that the variable Before turns out to be a predictor of future growth. The most likely explanation is
that holding a census is not an exogenous variable. So countries that initially do not have a census, and
later on have, are countries that are likely to have grown faster than average.
110:0041=0:0076 or 0:0037=0:0063, respectively.
12The immediate return and the half￿ life can be calculated by assuming that innovations in the education
variable are uniformly distributed over the observation period. We do the calculations for PEdu, and for




Second, we correct for the fact that part of e⁄ect is realized immediately. Since the short￿ run return, S,
18into question Krueger and Lindahl￿ s interpretation of this di⁄erence as being due to an
increase in the signal to noise ratio when lengthening the observation period. Lengthening
the observation period makes the short return look much like the long run return, which
happens to be substantially higher than the short run return. In Figure 3 the return to
education over the ￿rst 110 years is depicted. The time path of the cumulated returns to
education is very similar for the two time spans, and for the two education variables.
The results indicate that the GDP half￿ life adjustment ranges between 91 and 110
years,13 which stresses the idea that whichever externalities are associated with permanent
changes in education, they will take a long time before bene￿ting a given country. The
results indicate that the time length of the data sets currently available is too short to
identify in a precise way the long-run returns to the investment in education.
Finally, in Table 6 we replicate the estimations using Cohen and Soto￿ s (2001) education




















Finally, we take into account for the fact that the immediate e⁄ect is measured imperfectly, by using a
￿ve year time interval. Assuming that the innovation is distributed uniformly, we have to add half of the
length of the time interval. The estimated half-life is given by
110:0234 ￿ 13:7695 + 2:5 = 98:7539
The immediate e⁄ect has also to be corrected for the length of the observation period (the longer the
observation period, the more the estimated immediate e⁄ect will look like the long run e⁄ect). This can
be done by taking the time to reach the immediate e⁄ect corrected for half the time interval, and using a
￿rst order Taylor expansion of the function 1 ￿ e￿￿t, ￿t,
0:0063 ￿ (13:7695 ￿ 2:5) = 0:071.





13ln(2)=:0076 and ln(2)=:0063, respectively.
19variable. The di⁄erences with Barro and Lee￿ s data occur essentially on the coe¢ cient
on changes in education. In this case, the contemporaneous returns to education are
around 11%, more than 4 percentage points above our corrected estimates.14 In the long-
run, using EduCS indicates a return to education of about 49%, more than 8 percentage
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Figure 3: Returns to Education for the di⁄erent time spans and Education variables
4.2 Sensitivity analysis: the dynamic model
Adjusting the annualised equation (4), we can de￿ne the following dynamic model
LGDPit = ￿￿t + (1 + ￿￿)LGDPi;t￿￿ + ￿1￿Eduit + ￿￿2Edui;t￿￿ + ￿￿i + ￿"it, (5)
where ￿i is the country￿ s speci￿c e⁄ect.
14In our analysis, we are lacking 18 countries in Cohen and Soto￿ s data, which are in Barro and Lee
sample. The countries are Barbados, Botswana, Congo, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Hong Kong, Iceland,
Israel, Lesotho, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Rwanda, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
and Togo.
20Table 6: Growth regressions - comparison with Cohen and Soto data
10 year data
Variable Edu PEdu Edu EduCS
￿Edu .0838￿￿ .0664￿ .0664￿ .1107￿￿
(.0255) (.0285) (.0271) (.0342)
LagEdu .0036￿￿ .0039￿￿ .0037￿￿ .0032￿￿
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0009)
LagGDP -.0063￿￿ -.0066￿￿ -.0065￿￿ -.0065￿
(.0024) (.0025) (.0025) (.0026)
Census variables - - Yes -
R2 .2245 .2155 .2474 .2204
Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 5% ￿￿ : 1%. (Robust standard errors in paren-
theses). The dependent variable is annualised ￿rst-di⁄erence Log Real GDP
per worker. ￿Edu stands for annualized changes in education. All regressions
include time e⁄ects. The sample includes 300 observations and 79 countries.
In the presence of country￿ s speci￿c e⁄ect in equation (5), its estimation by OLS and
by the usual panel models, ￿xed or random e⁄ects, is inconsistent. The reason is that, by
de￿nition, LGDPi;t￿￿ in equation (5) is always correlated with ￿i. One possible solution to
overcome this problem is to take ￿rst di⁄erences in equation (5) to eliminate ￿i. Arellano
and Bond (1991) ￿rst-di⁄erenced generalized method of moments (GMM) is one of the
most applied solutions. Using their procedure avoids the bias introduced by omitted time-
invariant variables. However, this solution has poor ￿nite sample properties on bias and
precision when ￿the lagged levels of the series are only weakly correlated with subsequent
￿rst-di⁄erences, so that the instruments available for the ￿rst-di⁄erenced equations are
weak￿(Bond et al., 2001). Blundell and Bond (1998) show that, in this case, the solution
of Arellano and Bond (1991) has a large downward ￿nite-sample bias. This problem occurs
when the time series are persistent and the number of time series observations is small. An
alternative solution would be to implement a system GMM estimation, for ￿rst-di⁄erences
and levels, as argued by Blundell and Bond (1998). Bond et al. (2001) argue that this is
the best solution to estimate growth regressions.
Table 7, and Table 8 in appendix, present the results of the estimation of equation
21Table 7: Dynamic Income Regressions ￿10 year data
Model Sys FD No-FE Sys FD No-FE
Variable Edu PEdu
LagGDP 0.780￿￿ 0.843￿￿ 0.947￿￿ 0.915￿￿ 0.827￿￿ 0.941￿￿
( 0.116) ( 0.201) ( 0.026) ( 0.118) ( 0.178) ( 0.028)
￿Edu 0.132￿￿ -0.079 0.073￿￿ 0.097￿ -0.106 0.073￿￿
( 0.036) ( 0.163) ( 0.020) ( 0.038) ( 0.122) ( 0.023)
LagEdu 0.133￿￿ -0.097 0.038￿￿ 0.094y -0.124 0.039￿￿
( 0.041) ( 0.163) ( 0.011) ( 0.051) ( 0.126) ( 0.012)
Wald joint 637.48￿￿ 43.60￿￿ 6660.31￿￿ 658.87￿￿ 33.91￿￿ 6179.05￿￿
Wald time 104.004￿￿ 24.954￿￿ 116.953￿￿ 85.147￿￿ 22.871￿￿ 104.197￿￿
Sargan 23.822 13.490 23.623 28.436y 13.407 25.232
Sargan-df 19 12 21 19 12 21
DifSargan 10.333 10.134 15.028￿ 11.825
AR(1) -3.166￿￿ -2.450￿ -3.778￿￿ -3.363￿￿ -2.531￿ -3.704￿￿
AR(2) 1.557 0.850 1.482 1.243 0.974 1.306
Nobs 350 256 350 350 256 350
Ncountries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Signi￿cance levels: y : 10% ￿ : 5% ￿￿ : 1%. (Robust standard errors in parentheses). The
dependent variable is LGDP. All regressions include time e⁄ects. The estimation details, including
the instrumens used, are described in Section 4.2.
(5) using the data for 10 and 5 year intervals, respectively.15 For each education variable,
Edu and PEdu, and for each time span, we estimate equation (5) using the system pro-
cedure (Sys), the ￿rst-di⁄erenced procedure (FD), and a system procedure which assumes
the absence of a ￿xed country e⁄ect (No-FE). The dependent variable is real log income
per worker (LGDP), all regressions include time dummies, and education is treated as
a predetermined variable.16 The instruments for the ￿rst-di⁄erence equations are the
level of LGDP lagged two periods and earlier, and levels of education lagged one period
and earlier. For both variables we use at most 5 lags, following Bowsher (2002)￿ s sug-
gestion. For the level equations we use ￿rst-di⁄erence of LGDP lagged one period, and
contemporaneous ￿rst-di⁄erence of education. The estimation of No-FE is similar to sys-
15The results in Tables 7 and 8 are directly comparable with the results in Table 5 once we
control for the time span of the data. The transformations of the dynamic estimates follow from
equation (5).
16Modelling education as endogenous does not change the main results of this Section.
22tem estimation, but in this case the instruments for the equations in levels are not in
￿rst-di⁄erences but in levels. The reported results are for the 2-step GMM estimation
procedure, following the correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005).17
We test for the presence of the speci￿c e⁄ect following the procedure described in Arel-
lano (2003, p:124). The statistic of the test is the di⁄erence in the Sargan test associated
with the estimations FD and No-FE, which follows a chi-squared distribution with the
number of degrees of freedom given by the di⁄erence in the number of instruments in the
referred two estimations. We are testing the validity of the additional set of instruments,
when compared with the FD estimation. Our results indicate that we do not reject the
null hypothesis; i.e., we do not reject the hypothesis that there is no speci￿c country ef-
fect.18 This implies that the results we are lead to interpret are the ones in Table 5. OLS
estimates are consistent in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, and they are more
e¢ cient. Using equation (5) to compare the estimates, we observe that our results for the
NO-FE model using PEdu and 10 year data are very similar to the corresponding results
reproduced in Table 5. The returns to contemporaneous changes in education are 7:3%,
while the coe¢ cient on lag education is 0:004, and the coe¢ cient on lag income is 0:006.
The comparable ￿gures from the OLS estimation are 7:9%, 0:004 and 0:008, respectively.
Although the results for the estimation of the model Sys are very di⁄erent when we
use Edu and PEdu, they become identical when we estimate the model NO-FE. Using
PEdu matters when we compare the Sys and the NO-FE estimation, since the results
are more similar. In the 5 year data, Table 8 in appendix, the results for the system
estimation are unreliable with a coe¢ cient on lag income above one. Again, the results
for the estimation of NO-FE are similar between the two education variables, with the
exception of the coe¢ cient on ￿Edu. Using Edu indicates that the impact multiplier of
one year change in education is 4:7%, while using PEdu the equivalent value is 3:7%. As
17We used the Ox version of DPD (Doornik et al, 2002) to obtain the results in Tables 7 and
8.
18The No-FE type of regression has two more instruments when compared with the system
estimation. The reason is that in the ￿rst case we use an extra period in the level equations.
23before, the results for the 10 year data seem to be more stable.
5 Final remarks
Our analysis of Barro and Lee (2001) education data reveals that there is a systematic
di⁄erence between the information collected from census or surveys, and the education data
that results from the perpetual inventory method. On average, this method underestimates
education by about one ￿fth of a year every ￿ve year period. This has an impact on the
results for the growth regressions. Once we control for the source of information, and we
take into account for measurement error, we conclude that both the level and the change
in education are relevant for the growth process. However, alternative speci￿cations and
data intervals make a di⁄erence for the size of the e⁄ects. Further research is needed in
order to make proper use of the knowledge on the systematic di⁄erence between census
and non-census data.
Following Teulings and van Rens (2003), it would be important to take into account
for second order e⁄ects on education. The re-estimation of the data on education is
another alternative for future work. Using both the backward and the forward ￿ ow, the
missing values can be reestimated using the average of both predictions, not only the
weighted average between the linear interpolation and the forward prediction. However,
the estimation of the missing values after the last census, and before the ￿rst census, would
still be estimated the same way. It would also be important to estimate educational values
taking into account for di⁄erent survival rates according to the educational attainment.
On this topic, Barro and Lee (2001) state that ￿the limitation of the data on age-speci￿c
education levels and mortality rates by age group do not allow us to compute speci￿c
mortality rates of population by levels of education.￿
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27A Appendix
Table 8: Dynamic Income Regressions ￿5 year data
Model Sys FD No-FE Sys FD No-FE
Variable Edu PEdu
LagGDP 1.038￿￿ 0.916￿￿ 0.973￿￿ 1.043￿￿ 0.926￿￿ 0.973￿￿
( 0.054) ( 0.105) ( 0.011) ( 0.049) ( 0.093) ( 0.011)
￿Edu 0.037y 0.025 0.047￿￿ 0.034 0.007 0.037￿
( 0.020) ( 0.034) ( 0.016) ( 0.021) ( 0.043) ( 0.016)
LagEdu 0.015 0.008 0.017￿￿ 0.014 -0.002 0.016￿￿
( 0.018) ( 0.032) ( 0.005) ( 0.017) ( 0.041) ( 0.005)
Wald joint 1823.20￿￿ 83.72￿￿ 25416.69￿￿ 1862.55￿￿ 103.94￿￿ 26313.78￿￿
Wald time 103.707￿￿ 19.969￿￿ 89.606￿￿ 68.701￿￿ 21.981￿￿ 81.924￿￿
Sargan 76.094 61.642y 73.249 73.300 66.048￿ 73.794
Sargan-df 63 48 65 63 48 65
DifSargan 14.452 11.607 7.253 7.746
AR(1) -3.576￿￿ -3.387￿￿ -3.611￿￿ -3.572￿￿ -3.445￿￿ -3.602￿￿
AR(2) 1.080 1.068 1.089 1.051 1.030 1.055
Nobs 722 625 722 722 625 722
Ncountries 97 97 97 97 97 97
Signi￿cance levels: y : 10% ￿ : 5% ￿￿ : 1%. (Robust standard errors in parentheses). The
dependent variable is LGDP. All regressions include time e⁄ects. The estimation details, including
the instrumens used, are described in Section 4.2.
Table 9: Example of Census Variables for Figure 1
Year Census Before Last LastC After
1960 0 1 0 0 0
1965 1 0 0 0 0
1970 0 0 1 0 0
1975 0 0 2 0 0
1980 1 0 3 3 0
1985 1 0 1 1 0
1990 0 0 1 0 0
1995 1 0 2 2 0
2000 0 0 0 0 1
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